Bush's Likely Historical Verdict

Here was my assessment of how Bush will be viewed with time and some perspective, made in a comment to the Al Gore gone wild post:

How history treats him will depend exclusively upon what Iraq looks like in ten years. It is likely that other nations in the middle east will be similar, for better or for worse. I think it is too early to tell. But in the end, if he gets through his term without another terrorist attack, no one can argue that he hasn't protected the country adquately. Recall September 12th - where would you have placed the odds that we'd go this long without any successful attack on US soil?

Here is James Taranto, of the Wall Street Journal, clearly cribbing my blog:

The reality is that President Bush's legacy will be judged on two things: whether America is successful in Iraq, and, if so, whether success in Iraq helps promote democracy and discourage terrorism elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

If the former happens, history will recognize Bush as a near-great president; if the latter, as a great one. That's why Bush's foes in politics and in the media, here in America and overseas, have, with unseemly eagerness and impatience, embraced the idea that America is destined to fail in Iraq. And it is why they have to be feeling pretty blue after Saturday's successful constitutional referendum in Iraq.

What he added to my comments deserves further reflection: that Bush's foes have embraced the idea that America is destined to fail in Iraq with unseemly eagerness and impatience. As an example of this, consider the comments made by the Pulvarizer after my comment above:

Pulvarizer said...
Well Hatcher, you, and the gang of Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz/Pearle better not hold your breath for a truly reformed and democratic Iraq, because democracies don't form well in such a religiously divided environment. Democracy depends on a willingness to accept opposing views, and some form of concensus (The Federalist Papers and opposing views held therein are a prime example.) Iraq won't be able to foster that type of political environment, the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds are too pitted against each other, and it will take more than 10 years to heal that wound. Britain, France, and the US were composed of fairly homogenous cultures/religions when their democracies were formed. When we forced democracy on Japan/South Korea, same thing, a homogenous society of similar religious backgrounds. Not true in Iraq, or across many Middle East nations. As an opposing example, take Pakistan/India and their fight over Kashmir, large populations of opposing cultures/religions creates instability. A truly stable and democratic Iraq that will one day thank us for invading in 2002 is a pipe dream, but I have a feeling 10 years from now neo-cons will still be saying, "Give it another 10 years, these things take time." Boy, I wish I could use that excuse for my failures.

Ultimately, the neo-con theory that we can forcefully export democracy will be put next to the failed Domino theory of the Cold War (both of which have remarkable similarities, which the neo-cons fail to recognize.) The U.S. #1 goal is to promote STABILITY, not democracy (Realpolitik). If we can help nuture democracies along the way, great, but forcing it down a society that isn't suited for it, nor asked for it, is destined for failure. The post 9/11 world has changed the focus, but NOT the fundamental calculus of world politics. Let's talk again in 10 years.

I'm not unsympathetic to these arguments; they are in fact the same arguments that the paleo-conservatives (like Pat Buchannan) make in opposition to this war, and it is rather telling that liberals are willing to agree with Buchannan under circumstances where they think they might score points against Bush. I'm not persuaded by this view, because while the possibility of reform in the Middle East may have affected the calculus of the decision to go to war, I think it was viewed as more of a potential fringe benefit as opposed to a primary reason to go. Once you've gone and deposed the former leadership, you have 2 choices - put in your own thug and get the stability, or try to use the opportunity for Iraqis to govern themselves democratically. We've chosen the harder and more noble course, and the last time I checked, there were no liberals applauding the stability America enjoyed from guys like Pinochet in Chile, or the Shah in Iran.

But look at the tone of the comments, and ask yourself what the Pulvarizer is actually rooting for? You may be of the opinion that going in was a mistake, but it is the opinion of even most Democratics in Congress that leaving now would be a mistake. How can they think that if there is not ample potential, in their view, for a positive outcome. As much as it may pain people to consider the possibility that we will be successful, and that as a result Bush will in time be viewed as a great president, why on earth would you be rooting for any other outcome? Success would clearly be better for both us and the Iraqis, and the cost of fairly would be borne disproportionately by the Iraqis.

Go to Poland, today, and ask what the man on the street thinks of Reagan. The praise such a question would garner would make a liberal cringe, and I don't think that it is entirely inaccurate to suggest that many liberals would rather the Soviet Union survived the Cold War if they could keep to their conviction that Reagan represented a great threat to liberty. I think the same applies to Bush - there are those who secretly say to themselves with a degree of self-satisfaction whenever there is a setback in Iraq -"see, I told you so." I'm not suggesting it is true of the Pulvarizer, but I am suggesting it is true of many. There was even a professor in an American university who expressed a desire for a thousand Mogadishus (Black Hawk down), where 18 or so Amercian soldiers died in efforts to keep a set of thugs from murdering their fellow countrymen.

Right now, of course, Bush's approval ratings are low, but this will mean nothing in 10 years. It is only natural that they'd be low in the midst of a bold foreign policy that places most of the costs upfront, with the benefits, if we should be fortunate enough for them to transpire, coming later. It's like asking Professor Vic, in the middle of taking the Macro prelim in grad school (for the first, second, or third time - take your pick), whether the decision to go to grad school was a good idea. Bush could have done a better job articulating the case for war, but in ten years, regardless of what he did or did not say, actual events will matter most; what people theorized would happen in 2003 will not matter at all unless they were accurate. And arguably there have already been substantial benefits - removal of Saddam, Khaddafi abandoning WMDs, positive developments in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon. Not sure that all of these things will play out, but I know what I'm rooting for, and I'd be rooting for it even if Clinton were at the helm. Well, maybe. But if I weren't, at least I'd acknowledge I'm a sick man.